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CHURCHES, MEMBERS, AND THE ROLE OF THE COURTS:
TOWARD A CONTRACTUAL ANALYSIS
Kent S. Bernard*
I. Introduction
Much has been written on the relation between church and state, particularly in regard to education, an area of litigation in which members and

their organizations unite in seeking civil aid.' Little critical work has been done,
however, on the problem of how the state should react when an individual invokes the civil courts against his religious organization.2 This problem arises in
the context of various disputes between religious organizations and their members: when members are expelled from the group, when a clergyman is fired, or
when one group of members feels that another is taking control of the organization illegitimately. In these situations, it is not uncommon for the aggrieved
parties to seek help from a court of law. The cases often are highly emotional,
and are made yet more delicate by their involvement of the basic first amendment
religious guarantees. When faced with these challenges, courts have reacted in
various ways.
For example, let us assume a not unusual set of facts. A member of a religious organization is expelled from the group. He feels that the expulsion was
wrongful, and brings suit in civil court to compel his reinstatement. How should
the court handle such a case? Some courts have simply refused to get involved,'
reasoning that church membership is not an interest which they would protect.
Other courts have looked to state corporation law (in cases where the organization has incorporated) to determine only whether the state law requirements
* Associate, Montgomery, McCracken, Walker & Rhoads, Philadelphia, Pa.; J. D., University of Pennsylvania, 1975; B.A., Colgate University, 1972.
The author gratefully acknowledges the help and encouragement of Professors Bruce
Ackerman of the Yale Law School, and Peter Low of the University of Virginia Law School.
Their help in reading and criticizing earlier drafts of this article was invaluable. Any flaws or
oversights which may still remain are, of course, solely the author's responsibility.
1 See, e.g., W. GELHORN & R. KENT GREENAWALT, THE SECTARIAN COLLEGE AND THE
PUBLIC PURSE

(1970); V.

LANNIE,

PUBLIC MONEY AND PAROCHIAL EDUCATION

(1968);

Choper, The Establishment Clause and Aid to Parochial Schools, 56 CALIF. L. REV. 26
(1968); Iaskell, Prospects for Public Aid to ParochialSchools, 56 MINN. L. REv. 159 (1971);
Morgan, The Establishment Clause and Sectarian Schools: A Final Installment? 1973 Sup.
CT. REv. 57; Valente, Aid to Church Related Education-New Directions Without Dogma,
55 VA. L. REv. 579 (1969); Comment, Constitutionalityof Tax Credits as a Means of Providing Financial Assistance to ParochialSchools, 52 B.U.L. Rv. 871 (1972); Comment, New
Trends in Education and the Future of ParochialSchools, 57 CORNELL L. REv. 256 (1972);
Comment, Voucher Systems of Public Education after Nyquist and Sloan: Can a Constitutional System Be Devised? 72 MICe. L. Rnv. 895 (1974).

2 See W. STRONG, Two LECTURES UPON THE RELATIONS OF CIVIL LAW TO CH1URCH
POLrry, DISCIPLiNE, AND PROPERTY (1875); C. ZOLLV"ANN, AMERICAN CML CHURCH LAw
(1917) [hereinafter cited as ZOLLMANN], (while Zollman did write another edition in 1933,

American Church Law, the older version is more pointed and pungent); Dusenberg, Jurisdiction of Civil Courts over Religious Issues, 20 OHIO ST. L.J. 508 (1959) [hereinafter cited as
Dusenberg]; Patton, The Civil Courts and the Churches, 54 U. PA. L. REv. 391 '(1906).
3

(1949).

See, e.g., Mount Olive Primitive Baptist Church v. Patrick, 252 Ala. 672, 42 So.2d 617
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have been fulfilled,4 even if this required splitting the church into "civil" and
"religious" parts for analytical purposes.5 And some courts have gone directly
into the fray, and have tried to determine which side was correct as a matter
of religious law.'
While each of these approaches may have certain features which commend
it, the courts using them have not developed any coherent analytic structure
which would enable them to balance the policy interests at stake. This article
proposes such a structure, premised on a contractual view of the legal effect of
religious group membership, a view which has several advantages. A contract
approach is consistent with traditional judicial practice; and, indeed, the roots
of such an approach can be found in partial form in some of the many existing
theories for judicial treatment of church-member conflicts.7 This contract theory,
then, would not require a court to grasp a radically new or difficult conceptual
structure. Also, current constitutional law and theory, as drawn from both
church-member and aid to sectarian school cases, support the contract theory.
Both the constitutional and nonconstitutional cases in this area seem to
reflect two basic policy concerns. They are not articulated as such, but without
them the mass of opinions makes little, if any, sense. First, the courts do not
want to become enmeshed in issues and disputes over the interpretation of religious law. Even where no constitutional block is perceived, this fear of entanglement runs strongly through the approaches termed here "noninterventionist." '
It is seldom entirely absent from any decision. Second, a comprehensive reading
of the cases leads one to a firm feeling that courts recognize that members of religious organizations have certain reasonable expectations about how they will be
treated in their relationship with the organizations, and that these should be
protected in some way. The contract theory set forth herein is proposed as an
analytic structure which can best accommodate both concerns. While the important policy concerns, however, are often not apparent in the decisions, the important legal questions are easily identified:
1) Recognizing that an individual gives up some of his "civil" freedom
when he affiliates with a religious organization,9 over what disputes, if
any, should civil courts take jurisdiction in this area?
2) What criteria should the courts apply to decide those cases?
4 Cf. Hayes v. Brantley, 50 Misc. 2d 1040, 280 N.Y.S.2d 291 (1967).
5 See Walker Memorial Baptist Church v. Saunders, 285 N.Y. 462, 35 N.E.2d 42 (1941).
6 Cf. Lutheran Free Church v. Lutheran Free Church (not merged), 273 Minn. 332, 141
N.W.2d 827 (1966).
7 Determination of the extent of an individual's submission to his religious organization
and the jurisdiction of religious tribunals are part of the two-entity theory, see text accompanying notes 50-57 infra, as well as a moderate interventionist approach, see text accompanying

note 64 infra. Questions of procedural regularity are raised, in embryonic form, even in a
minimal intervention approach, see text accompanying notes 42-45 infra. A specific contractual
approach has been suggested in many theories, including some noninterventionist ones, see
text accompanying notes 20-21 infra.
8 See text accompanying notes 14-37, infra.

9

This is possibly most explicit in regard to the Roman Catholic Church, which has a

substantial body of its own law governing the actions of people subject to the Church. See
generally T. BoUscAREN, A. ELLIS & F. KORTH, CANON LAw: A TEXT AND COMMENTARY

(4th rev. ed. 1966) (setting forth and describing the official collection, the CoRpus iuRis

CANONrCI).
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These central legal questions are nonconstitutional. While there are serious
constitutional questions lurking at the outer edges of the field,1" the seminal case
in the area11 was nonconstitutional and much of the law continues to develop
along nonconstitutional lines."2 And as should become evident, to say that an
approach is constitutional is not to say that it is desirable or practicable. But, in
fact, when those latter two concerns are resolved, the constitutional issues can be
seen to have been met too. A significant number of cases have arisen in the area
of church property disputes, and have been treated elsewhere. 3 While the contract approach is completely applicable to such cases, the primary concern will
be with the individual and the legal structure of his relation with a religions
organization.
The advantages of the contract approach to church-member conflicts are
most apparent when viewed against the background of other approaches that
courts have employed. These other approaches, nonintervention and various
forms of intervention, are examined, therefore, prior to a detailed exposition of
the proposed contract approach. In analyzing each of these approaches the two
policy concerns, entanglement and reasonable expectation of members, will be
specifically examined in light of the legal questions posed above.
II. The Nonintervention Approach
As noted, some courts basically refuse to handle church-member conflict
cases at all. This nonintervention approach to intrachurch disputes has a long
history. The Pandora's box of civil-church jurisdiction was opened officially by
4
the Supreme Court in Watson v. Jones,"
a venerable case involving the Presbyterian Church amidst the pains of post-Civil War reconstruction. A split devel10 Most of the concern arises over the second question, the criteria and methods which a
court should use in this area. See, e.g., Gilkey, The Judicial Role in Intra-Chureh Disputes
Under the Constitutional Guarantees Relating to Religion, 75 W. VA. L. Rxv. 105 (1972);
Kauper, Church Autonomy and the First Amendment: The Presbyterian Church Case, 1969
Sup. CT. REV. 347; Comment, Constitutional Law-Freedom of Religion-Limitation on
Civil Courts in Intra-Church Property Disputes, 21 S.C.L. Rlv. 441 (1969); Comment,
Judicial Intervention in Church Property Disputes--Some Constitutional Considerations, 74
YALE L.J. 1113 (1965).
11 Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1871). The nonconstitutional status of
Watson v. Jones was explicitly acknowledged by the Court in Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94, 115-16 (1952), where it was noted that Watson was decided well before
the first amendment was applied to the states via the fourteenth. Hence the case presented no
constitutional issue to the early Court. The complex factual machinations of Kedroff are discussed in detail in Dusenberg, supra note 2, at 516-24. Constitutional considerations set the
outer limit beyond which a court may not move, but, as will be demonstrated, within the field
so delimited the analysis is of a nonconstitutional character. See text accompanying notes 3137 infra.
12 See Gorodetzer v. Kraft, 277 N.E.2d 685 (1972); Mitchell v. Albanian Orthodox
Diocese, 355 Mass. 278, 244 N.E.2d 276 (1969); Polen v. Cox, 259 Md. 25, 267 A.2d 201
(1970); Western Pa. Conf. of United Methodist Church v. Everson Evangelical Church of
North America, 454 Pa. 434, 312 A.2d 35 (1973); Olston v. Halock, 55 Wis.2d 687, 201
N.W.2d 35 (1972).
13 See, e.g., Casad, Church Property Litigation: A Comment on the Hull Church Case,
27 WAsH. & LEE L. REv. 44 (1970); Note, Judicial Intervention in Disputes over the Uie of
Church Property, 75 HLv. L. Rzv. 1142 (1962); Comment, Constitutional Law--Church
Property Disputes-FirstAmendment Prohibits JudicialExamination of Ecclesiastical Matters,
54 IA. L. Rnv. 899 (1969); and sources cited in note 10 supra.
14 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1871).
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oped between the national church organization and the Louisville, Kentucky,
congregation. At issue was whether Christian social responsibility should be
defined to include loyalty to the federal government and abhorrence of slavery.
The local body sought control over the local church property alleging that the
national group, which remained loyal to the Union, had lost the true faith and
that it (the local church) was the true presbytery.' The Court, in holding for
the national church, offered a rationale of uncompromising character which has
had an enduring, and unfortunate, impact on later courts.
[W]henever the questions of discipline, or of faith, or ecclesiastical rule,
custom, or law, have been decided by the highest of these church judicatories
to which the matter has been carried, the legal tribunals must accept, such
decisions as final, and as binding on them in their application to the case
before them.16
A year later the Court retreated somewhat from that absolute position in
Boudin v. Alexander,"' a case in which the application of the Watson rule would
have led to a palpable injustice. A small faction of a Baptist congregation, along
with the minister, had purported to depose the trustees of the congregation and
elect new ones. These new trustees promptly expelled the majority of the congregation and seized control of the church property. The Court, in affirming a
decree restoring possession of the church to the majority, tempered the Watson
rule, saying:
[W]e cannot decide who ought to be members of the church, nor whether
the excommunicated have been regularly or irregularly cut off.... But we
may inquire whether the resolution of expulsion was the act of the church
or of persons who were not the church. . . . In a congregational church,
the majority, if they adhere to the organization and doctrines, represent the
church."8
Had the rule of Watson been rigorously applied, the internal actions of the
church body would have been beyond scrutiny, irrespective of whether that body
adhered to its doctrines or organization. The question surely involved ecclesiasti15

A more detailed analysis of the factual interplay can be found in many church property

articles. See, e.g., Comment, Judicial Intervention in Disputes over Church Property, 75
HA v. L. Rav. 1142 (1962); Comment, Constitutional Law-Freedom of Religion-Limitation on Civil Courts in Intra-ChurchProperty Disputes, 21 S.C. L. REv. 441 (1969).

16

80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 727. The result of such reasoning was castigated by Zollmann:
[A] denial of the right of civil tribunals in a proper case to construe the constitution,
canons, or rules of the church and revise its trials and proceedings of its governing
bodies, instead of preserving religious liberty, destroys it pro tanto. If a person
who connects himself with a religious association is to be placed completely at its
mercy irrespective of the agreement which he has made with it, the conception of
religious liberty as applied to such a case becomes a farce, a delusion and a snare.
ZOLLMANN, supra note 2, at 205.
17 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 131 (1872).
18 Id. at 139-140 (emphasis supplied). There is a basic distinction between congregational
organizations and hierarchical ones. In the former, majority rules. In the latter, the decision
of the highest tribunal is deemed dispositive and final. This distinction, was emphasized
in Krecker v. Shirey where the court said:

An independent congregation may be governed by a majority of its own membership, but a congregation connected with any given denomination must submit to the
system of discipline peculiar to the body to which it is connected (citations omitted).
163 Pa. 534, 551, 30 A. 440, 443 (1894).
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cal law, rule, or custom, and by its terms Watson should have applied. Yet this
seemed quitewrong, and the Court was willing to temper the precedent. Why,
after all, should a small group be permitted to take property and escape review
simply because it cloaks itself with the mantle "religious organization"? The
Watson test proved to be too blunt an analytic tool. It responded well to fears
of entanglement, but completely ignored the legitimate expectations of the
members.
In 1876, a milder theory of nonintervention was expressed by Judge Redfield, an important legal commentator of the time, when he noted:
[Tihe courts will not interfere with the internal policy and discipline of
churches... so long as they keep within their own rules, which were known
to the members, or might have been learned by them upon reasonable inquiry at the time of connecting themselves with ... the church.' 9
Had the courts followed this approach, the course of civil-church judicial relations would have been much smoother than what actually occurred. But courts
often took the first clause to heart and refused to intervene, without considering
whether the church had followed its own rules or whether those rules should
have been known by the members.
The primary tension engendered by the Watson rule between the principles
of.religious freedom for organizations and those of simple justice to the individual
were later confronted by Justice Brandeis. Gonzalez v. Archbishop" involved a
claim by Gonzalez that he had a right to be a Catholic chaplain under the terms
of the will which endowed the chaplaincy. The Archbishop refused to so appoint
him, on the ground that he was unqualified under canon law. The Court upheld
the Archbishop's actions and Brandeis, for the Court, tempered Watson yet further, saying:
In the absence of fraud, collusion, or arbitrariness,the decisions of the proper

church tribunals on matters purely ecclesiastical, although affecting civil
rights, are accepted in litigation before the secular courts as conclusive,
2

because the parties in interest have made them so by contract or otherwise. 1

Watson commanded complete and unqualified deference by civil courts to religious tribunals on ecclesiastical questions. Boudin required that the tribunals
adhere to the organization and doctrines they professed before such conclusive
effect attached to their judgments. Gonzalez extended the scope of review such
that the decisions of even a properly constituted tribunal, adhering to church doctrine, could be reviewed if the decision was arbitrary or fraudulent. While the
scope of review expanded, none of the early cases required a religious organization
to follow its own procedural rules. Later courts tended to ignore Brandeis' caveat
19 Redfield, Commentary, 24 U. -PA. L. REv. 264, 278 (1876).

An inquiry into why this

is the case leads one to some version of the contract theory discussed in text accompanying
notes 73-156 infra.
20 280 U.S. 1 (1929).
21 Id. at 16 (emphasis supplied).
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of fairness and Redfield's note about keeping religious tribunals within bounds. 2
Yet this next step, seen by Redfield, seems implicit in the early decisions. Unless
religious organizations are bound to abide by their own rules and limitations, it is
hard to justify moving beyond the straight Watson rule except on an ad hoc
"shocks the conscience" basis.
Some modem courts are unwilling to face the cumulative result of the line
of early cases. These courts leave the aggrieved member with little or no protection at all. In Wolozyn v. Begarek2" members of a church corporation sought a
court order to allow them to examine the corporation's records. The court refused, holding that state law allowed inspection for any "proper purpose," and
because the information sought had to do with acts of the corporation in influencing or changing concepts of the church which involved dogma and doctrine,24
there was no "proper purpose" behind the plea. The court based its reading of
the statute upon a holding that it would not review actions of a religious corporation relating to ecclesiastical affairs for the purpose of ascertaining whether
those actions were in accord with the policy, discipline, or usages of the church.2"
The non sequitur is breathtaking. The only action which the court was asked
to review was the withholding of corporate records. Plaintiffs sought only inspection rights, they did not ask for judicial determination of any ecclesiastical questions at all. The court gave no reason for treating the corporate aspects of the
religious corporation differently from the way it would treat those same aspects
were a civil corporation involved. Given the facts of the case and the plaintiff's
plea, it is hard to see what principled reasons the court could have advanced to
support its action. Plaintiffs advanced the purpose that they were inquiring into
possible mismanagement of the organization. The court did not deny that this
was a "proper purpose" for inspection, but it went further. It considered the
merits of a future mismanagement action and decided that because it would not
take the possible later suit, it would not grant relief here. Thus the religious
organization was allowed to claim the benefits of corporate existence and yet to
avoid at least some of its burdens simply because it was a religious organization.
This veers dangerously close to the constitutional safeguard against the establishment of religion, and there seems no principled reason for the court to have gone
this far. To refuse intervention here was to retreat well behind the Gonzalez
theory, and even exceeds the deference paid to religious organizations in Watson
itself. Here there was no question of ecclesiastical rule or custom, nor was the
plaintiff claiming anything at all to do with church discipline.
In terms of the two root policy concerns, courts following this nonintervention approach ignore the reasonable expectations of the members that the
organization will treat them in the manner set out in the organization's rules
(including any applicable state law, which would be incorporated implicitly
into the rules). To enforce such a limitation would still preserve the main
22 Brown v. Mount Olive Baptist Church, 255 Iowa 857, 124 N.W.2d 445 (1963) is a
typical example of a more modem court still hewing to the old theory. See also cases collected
in Annot. 20 A.L.R.2d 421 (1951).
23 378 P.2d 1007 (Okla. 1963).
24 Id. at 1011.
25

Id.
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attraction of the noninterventionist theory-its freedom from entanglement in
questions of religious law.
While adhering to a noninterventionist approach generally, some courts
have refused to shut their doors so completely. They have developed the theory
that civil courts can decide issues which primarily involve "civil" or "property"
rights, while still eschewing purely ecclesiastical questions.26 Mount Olive Primitive Baptist Church v. Patrick"? took this approach to its standard conclusion.
Plaintiffs had been ousted from membership in the church without notice, and
sought reinstatement. The court dismissed the suit, on the ground that it would
not intervene to settle disputes over the right to church membership. Taking the
court's theory and conclusion 8 together leads to some puzzlement about the legal
status of the membership right. What is clear, however, is that for courts following this line of analysis, an individual's membership in a religious organization
is held at the pleasure of that organization, with no civil safeguards whatever. It
is true that Gonzalez permitted review if the organization acted arbitrarily," but
in light of the extreme deference exhibited by courts using this theory,"0 such permission would seldom be utilized.
One primary problem with this approach is the lack of agreement as to
what rights fall under the protected headings. For example, in contrast to the
Mount Olive decision, another court simply stated that "the right to share in the
government of a [religious] corporation is a civil right which the law will protect... ."" The case law provides little or no analysis on why such a right will,
or will not, be protected, and this seems to highlight the problem with the distinction between "civil" and "ecclesiastical" questions.
Courts have tried to justify nonintervention on the ground that they "lack
the qualifications" to decide certain classes of cases."3 The Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts took this route in denying an action by an association
of kosher butchers which sought to enjoin the defendant, Associated Synagogues,
from interfering with business, and to have the defendant certify a given butcher
as being "kosher." The Court held itself not qualified to determine whether a
given method of meat preparation qualified under Jewish law, refused the other
26 Some courts still adhere to this dichotomy today. See Ogden St. Church of God in
Christ v. Gospel Temple Church of God in Christ, 522 P.2d 757 (Colo. App. 1974); Lowe v.

First Presbyterian Church of Forest Park, 56 Ill.
2d 404, 308 N.E.2d 801 (1974). Interestingly enough, Watson itself was a church property case, yet courts have tended to ignore the rule
of that case in property contexts while invoking it with due solemnity in nonproperty cases.
27 252 Ala. 672, 42 So. 2d 617 (1949).
28 This conclusion is a common one. See, e.g., Stewart v. Jarriel, 206 Ga. 855, 59 S.E.2d
368 (1950).
29 280 U.S. 1, 16 (1929), discussed in text accompanying notes 20-21 supra.
30 See, e.g., Wolozyn v. Begarek, supra, at notes 23-25.
31 Trustees of E. Norway Lake Norwegian Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Halvorson, 42
Minn. 502, 508, 44 N.W. 663, 665-66 (1890).
32 The contract approach avoids this problem by not having the court make any independent characterization of the right claimed. It looks instead to the question of who had
the power to classify the right, and whether that body followed its own rules. The advantages
of the civil/ecclesiastical dichotomy in terms of avoiding entanglement in religious law are
preserved, but the reasonable expectations of the members are also taken into account. See
text accompanying notes 96-97 infra.
33 See, e.g., United Kosher Butchers v. Associated Synagogues, 349 Mass. 595, 211 N.E.2d

332 (1965)

(discussed below).
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issue, and dismissed the suit. 4 Perhaps the result was correct, but it was not
required by the rationale which the court offered. The concern which impels a
court to evade a case for lack of qualifications seems, at base, a legitimate fear
that the case will drag the court into interpreting and deciding questions of
ecclesiastical law. And it is quite true that civil courts may not be qualified to do
this. But this does not necessarily mean that the cases should be dismissed. If
the court were willing to consider whether church procedure had been observed,
as suggested by Judge Redfield, the dispute might be resolved without resort to
ecclesiastical law. In the rare case where both sides ask that the court decide a
question of religious law, the court could treat that law exactly the way it treats
the law of any other foreign body when that law becomes involved in a suit
before it.5
While some courts were, and still are, reluctant to hear the claims of an
individual member aggrieved by the actions of his religious organization, they
generally are willing to require the individual member to obey the rules of the
organization. 6 These cases are implicitly grounded on contractual principles.
Consistency would require similar enforcement of the obligations of the organizations to their members.8 7
It is difficult to derive any uniform principles from the actions of noninterventionist courts. In general, such courts will answer the two legal questions
posed previously as follows:
1) Civil courts should take jurisdiction over some nonecclesiastical, property-related issues.
2) The issues should be decided on standard legal criteria, irrespective of
the religious character of the parties.
The lack of a coherent conceptual framework for handling these disputes has
severely hampered any reasoned policy analysis by the courts. Their approach
to the first question reflects a legitimate fear of entanglement, but is otherwise
incoherent.
III. Types of Interventionist Approaches
At the same time as many courts were professing allegiance to the nonintervention doctrine, a second category of more activist judicial thought was evolving. Although it began much earlier,"8 this activist approach is a natural outgrowth of the Gonzalez dictum authorizing courts to intervene in cases of fraud,
34

Id. The court's actions seem strained because under the state's kosher food law, MAss.
this would seem to be exactly the kind of decision the
court had to make. It should, however, be noted that this same court later explicitly adopted
a contract framework for handling such questions, see text accompanying notes 141-151 infra.
35 See ZOLLMANN, supra note 2, at 208.
36 See, e.g., Rector, Church of Holy Trinity v. Melish, 3 N.Y.2d 476, 146 N.E.2d 685,
168 N.Y.S.2d 952 (1957); Darret v. Church of God in Christ No. 1, 381 S.W.2d 720 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1964).
37 See ZOLLMANN, supra note 2, at 225-6 and the cases cited therein.
38 See, e.g., Deaderick.v. Lampson, 58 Tenn. (11 Heisk.) 523 (1872). See also Bear v.
Heasley, 98 Mich. 279, 57 N.W. 270 (1893).
ANN. LAws ch. 94, § 156 (1967),
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collusion, or arbitrariness. 9 To determine whether a religious organization has
acted arbitrarily, a court has to take some positive steps beyond nonintervention.
But at this point any semblance of a consistent approach vanishes, and courts
pursue numerous paths ranging from merely upholding state laws which serve
to regulate religious corporations, ° to determining substantive church doctrine
and identifying the faction which is preserving it.4 1
Minimal intervention is well illustrated by Hayes v. Brantley." The pastor
of a Baptist church sued the deacons and trustees, claiming to have been wrongfully dismissed from his job. The court looked only as far as the state's religious
corporation laws to decide in the pastor's favor." Under the applicable statute,
notice of a dismissal meeting had to be publicly read by the minister or a trustee
of the church.44 In this instance, the only readings had been done by a secretary
of the organization. Since the readings were void, a properly called meeting had
not taken place, and, therefore, the dismissal was inoperative4 5 There is a deceptive ease to this logic which masks several questions. Why, conceding that the
membership had actual notice of the meeting, should the religious corporation
be held to such minute compliance with the statute? After all, it was a general
meeting which dismissed the pastor, not some secret caucus of the trustees. 6 No
one contended thatprejudice resulted from having the secretary, rather than a
trustee, read the notice. And the action could hardly be called fraudulent, collusive or arbitrary. While the court did not address these questions, the most plausible answer to them is that the pastor was held to have "contracted" for such
procedural rectitude as part of his relationship with the corporation. But, in
any event, the court intervened minimally, inquiring no further than compliance
with state law.
This approach looks to state law, rather than the agreement of the parties,
to determine which bodies have authority and how they are to exercise it. Insofar
as state law is, perforce, incorporated into the organizations' governing rules,
this approach is contractual. But most, if not all, organizations go beyond positive state law in setting up their internal procedures. The state law theory will
not enforce these supplementary rules. It thus defeats the expectations of the
members to the extent that such expectations go beyond the limited reach of positive state law. The policy supporting this self-imposed limit on the court is the
fear of entanglement in religious law should the court venture beyond those areas
clearly delineated in state statutes'.
A less timorous approach takes to heart the adage that in framing the question one determines what the answer will be. A kosher caterer sued the Associated
Synagogues, alleging libel.47 The court took jurisdiction because it found that
39 280 U.S. at 16 (1929); see also text accompanying note 21 supra.
40 Hayes v. Brantley, discussed in text accompanying notes 42-45 infra.
41 See, e.g., Holiman v. Dovers, 236 Ark. 211, 366 S.W.2d 197 (1963) and text accompanying note 66 infra.
42 53 Misc. 2d 1040, 280 N.Y.S.2d 291 (1967).
43 N.Y. RELIG. ConP. LAw § 130 et seq. (McKinney 1952).
44 Id. § 133.
45 53 Misc. 2d at 1040-41, 280 N.Y.S.2d at 292-93.
46 In fact the trustees would have no power to dismiss a pastor; see text accompanying
note 53 infra.
47 Gorodetzer v. Kraft, 277 N.E.2d 685 (Mass. 1972).
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the alleged libel could reasonably be understood as an accusation of larceny and
embezzlement, and thus the issue could be decided without reference to any
religious questions.4 Had the issue been framed in terms of a charge that plaintiff had violated kosher preparation methods, the court would not have allowed
the suit, since it then would have required proof (in the court's eyes) as to what
was, or was not, in accord with Jewish law. 9 There is nothing objectionable
in a court's seeking to view a case from the least complicated perspective. The
danger is that the court simply may retire from the field when no such perspective
can be found, as this same court did in United Kosher Butchers.
The third major interventionist approach can be called the two-entity
0
theory, and is illustrated by Walker Memorial Baptist Church v. Saunders."
The issue was whether the minister of a Baptist church had been illegitimately
removed from his pastorate and certain members of the church wrongfully
expelled from membership in the church corporation. 5 The court bifurcated
the church organization into corporate and religious entities, and held that:
The sphere of legal activity of a religious corporation in so far as its
corporate activities can be separated from its ecclesiastical activities, is governed and limited by the Religious Corporation Law ....

52

The court reasoned that the minister of a Baptist church is an officer of the religious body of the church, and, consequently, the corporate body had no power
over the issue of his discharge.5" The court found that under state54 law all
members of the religious body were ipso facto voting members of the corporate
body as well.55 Since the expelled individuals were all members of the religious
body, the corporation could not expel them from voting participation in the
corporate body.56 Only if a member died, moved, or was expelled from the religious body could he be denied voting rights in the corporation.5"
Courts following this approach intervene farther than those applying a minimal intervention theory. Rather than treating the religious organization as a
unitary but special group, the two-entity approach requires a court to discriminate
between the respective jurisdictions of two different bodies, governed by different
sets of rules, within the same organization. A consequence of constructing such
a framework is that suits against the corporate body, if properly brought, do not
raise any "religious" questions at all, and hence fall neatly within the purview
of civil courts. A court can treat the action as it would any other suit against a
48 Id. at 686-87.
49 See United Kosher Butchers v. Associated Synagogues, 349 Mass. 595, 211 N.E.2d
332 (1965) (discussed in text accompanying note 34 supra).
50 285 N.Y. 462, 35 N.E.2d 42 (1941). This approach is still used by some courts.
See Gospel Tabernacle Body of Christ Church v. Peace Publishers & Co., 506 P.2d
1135 (Kan. 1973).
51 285 N.Y. at 465, 35 N.E.2d at 43.
52 Id. at 467, 35 N.E.2d at 44.
53 Id. at 472, 35 N.E.2d at 46. Of course this root question of the jurisdiction of a religious organization (or part thereof) to act is a prime focus of any judicial intervention. It is
included in the contract theory.
54 N.Y. RELIG. Co". LAw § 134 (McKinney 1952).
55 285 N.Y. at 473, 35 N.E.2d at 46.
56 Id. at 474, 35 N.E.2d at 47.
57 Id. at 473, 35 N.E.2d 47.
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corporation, and adjudicate it in accordance with normal state law."
This approach has some surface logic. But it still makes positive state law
the parameter of its protection of member expectations. And if the issue at stake
is controlled by the "religious" body (such as the question of membership in that
body), there is no structure by which the court can evaluate and handle the
dispute.
There is one rather unusual approach which defies classification. An individual sued for a declaration that he was a member of a religious organization.
The court held that an expelled member must exhaust his remedies within the
religious organizations before seeking redress in the civil courts. 9 The fascinating
part of this approach is the ambiguous threat which it carries for both sides.
Had the court simply refused to intervene and said no more, we would be back
in the noninterventionist camp. But the court said more, it encouraged an
inference that it would intervene, at the proper point of ripeness. What it would
do then, no one knows."' As frequently happens, the court gave no explanation
for its actions. One plausible suggestion would be that while a court could review
the decision of a religious tribunal,62 it would not act until that decision had
been made final. This would be to apply the theory of review of administrative
agencies to the field of religious tribunals.6 3 So long as the decision could be
reversed by the organization's procedures themselves, there was nothing (on this
view) that required the court to act.
The last major interventionist approach shuns the delicate conceptual surgery required by the two-entity approach, and examines the acts of a religious
organization regardless of their substantive content. One branch of this approach
maintains that courts should make only the threshold determination of whether
the religious body had jurisdiction over the particular topic. 4 If the organization
acted within its authority, the inquiry is ended. Courts taking this line do consider the limits of the members' submission to the organization, but do not consider issues of procedural regularity.
The other branch of this approach is the most active of all. Procedural
regularity of the church as well as other questions is within its ambit. This
approach is most common in church property disputes, where the court seeks to
determine which faction of a church abides by original doctrine and hence deserves to get the church property. Property is perceived as a trust fund for the
use of the group which still adheres to the beliefs and practices employed at the
58 See, e.g., Kupperman v. Congregation Nusach Sfard of the Bronx, 39 Misc. 2d 107, 240
N.Y.S.2d 315 (1963).
59 Rodyk v. Ukrainian Autocephalic Orthodox Church, 31 App. Div. 2d 659, 296
N.Y.S.2d 496 (1968), aff'd, 29 N.Y.2d 898, 328 N.Y.S.2d 685 (1972).
60 See text accompanying note 23 supra.
61 See, e.g., Horosym v. St. John's Greek Catholic Church, 239A.D. 563, 267 N.Y.S.
906 (1933).
62 This review could be by the arbitral standard suggested infra, text accompanying notes
74-75 et seq., or by some other standard.
63 See generally K. DAvis, ADMrNIsTRATIVn LAW Th=T=Sn §§ 20.01-20.10 (1958).
64 See, e.g., Denton v. Bennett, 364 S.W.2d 857 (Tex. Civ. App. 1963). This approach
blends with the two-entity theory in that both seek to determine the jurisdiction of the
acting body. The two approaches differ in method, however, and it is fruitful to treat them
as distinct.
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time the property was given to the organization." In applying this "departure
from the doctrine" test, courts found themselves determining what is, or is not, a
major deviation from doctrinal principles."s Obviously, this can involve rather
fine points of theology; and courts, not being particularly adept theologians as a
rule, produced some amazing results." Fortunately for all concerned, the Supreme Court put an end to such fun by holding the "departure from the doctrine" test unconstitutional.68
Even putting aside constitutional questions, the departure from doctrine
approach epitomizes the fear of entanglement in religious law which motivated
the noninterventionist courts. When a civil court attempts to set dogma for a
religious organization, it violates the premises upon which legitimate court intervention is based.69 Intervention is justified on grounds of protecting free exercise
and the reasonable expectations of members. By attempting to freeze, in some
way, the original doctrines of a religious organization, "departure from the doctrine" courts have limited the groups' free exercise rights rather severely. The
group majority is constrained from modifying its beliefs or practice for fear
that a minority group which objects to the modification can retain control of
church property and exclude the majority. Of course, the trust fund theory, upon
which many of these cases rely, responds to the reasonable expectations of
givers of property to religious organizations. It pays little notice, however, to
possible problems of entanglement, and requires courts to make an independent,
external determination of religious doctrine which threatened the free-exercise
rights both of present members and of the organizations themselves.
In addition, the analysis rests on an a priori judgment that every grantor is
presumed to have expected the doctrines and usages of his religious organization
not to change, and that such an expectation was reasonable and deserving of
protection. Whatever validity such assumptions may have in certain cases, it
seems a strong oversimplification to claim that they apply to all grants and
grantors. Yet it must be conceded that the trust fund theory had a superficially
appealing contractual slant to it; the grantor "contracted" that his gift be used
only by a group with certain doctrines. By focussing on the supposed doctrinal
substance of that contract, however, the courts ignored the anterior question
65 See Mills v. Yount, 393 S.W.2d 96 (Mo. Ct. App. 1965); see generally Annot. 15
A.L.R.3d 297, 320 (1967). For a more detailed discussion of the implied trust fund theory
which made these disputes possible, see Note, Judicial Intervention over the Use of Church
Property, 75 H~av. L. REv. 1142, 1151-54 (1962). See also Comment, Enforcing Conditions
Placed On Gifts to Religious Institutions-JudicialInterference with the Free Exercise of
Religion, 49 B.U.L. R-v. 742 (1969).
66 See Lutheran Free Church v. Lutheran Free Church (not merged), 273 Minn. 332,
141 N.W.2d 827 (1966).
67 One court, in struggling to decide a case using this criterion, was driven to state:
But is this doctrine of the Virgin Birth so fundamentally different from the belief in
the "Fatherhood of God," "that Jesus is the Son of God and the Savior," and "that
the Bible is the Word of God?" Is it basically a violation of the dictum or tenet
"no Creed but Christ, no rule of faith and conduct but the Bible?" There may
be some theological distinction, but there is none to the ordinary lay person. To
most people trinitarian belief imputes divine origin to Jesus, stemming from the

New Testament account of his birth.
Ragsdall v. Church of Christ in Eldora, 244 Iowa 474, 55 N.W.2d 539 (1952).
68 This is a result of the Hull Church case discussed in notes 98-204 infra. Some of the
literature surrounding the decision is catalogued in notes 10-13 supra.
69 See note 111, infra, where these premises are discussed more fully.
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whether the original parties also agreed that the contract be modifiable. It is
reasonable to suppose that at least some grantors recognized that doctrine can
evolve. When this factor is taken into account, the court's examination should
shift to whether the organization had the power to modify the contract, and
whether it exercised that power in accordance with the agreement.
Since to assume nonmodifiability limits the range of choice, and, concomitantly, the free exercise rights both of the organization and of the grantor, it
would seem (in the absence of explicit evidence to the contrary) that the trust
fund theory should have started with a presumption that the original contract
with the grantor was modifiable. Had it done so, it would not have had to
interpret dogma at all. And, in the rare case of a nonmodifiable contract, the
court would still have to ask only what person or group of persons had the power
to interpret the agreement. If some religious tribunal had that power, an arbitral
matrix can be applied. 0 If the power is expressly granted to the courts, no first
amendment problems would arise. In no instance has a court held that the act
of interpreting an agreement which specifically vests the court with such a power
of interpretation is in any way illegitimate simply because one of the parties is
a religious organization." On constitutional principle, the court, in interpreting
such an agreement, treats the parties in the same way that it treats parties to any
other (nonreligious) agreement. Nothing is being forced upon an unwilling
religious group. On the contrary, refusal to interpret such an agreement, where
agreements of nonreligious groups would be interpreted, could raise severe free
exercise problems. The court, in effect, would be denying the use of its facilities
to consenting parties because the parties were religious.1
This analysis of the radically interventionist departure from the doctrine
approach points toward another possibility, a middle ground between intervention and nonintervention. By applying contract principles in the manner suggested, a court could arguably uphold the expectations of church members to
a considerable extent while avoiding the pitfalls of entanglement.
'IV. The Contract Approach
As illustrated by the foregoing discussion, courts in general have reached
disparate results and have not carefully analyzed the relationship of the member
to his religious group. Some courts, however, even early in the development of
church-member conflict law, found that contractual analysis provided a valuable
framework for resolution of church-member issues. In 1890 the Supreme Court
of Minnesota made an extended examination of the relationship of a member to
his religious group, and found that it could be construed as a contract between
the organization and member. This made it possible for the court to determine
whether the organization had acted "wrongfully" without having to evaluate
competing arguments as to the substantive content of the religious law.

70
71

See text accompanying note 125, infra.
See text accompanying notes 123-131, infra.

72 See note 125, infra.

NOTRE DAME LAWYER

[April 1976]

[W]here the contract provides, or by implication contemplates, that the
question... shall be determined by some church judicatory, the decision of
such judicatory, duly made, when the matter has been properly brought
before it, will be conclusive upon the civil courts. And this is so, not because
the law recognizes any authority in such bodies to make any decision touching civil rights, but because the parties, by their contract, have made the
right of property to depend on adherence to or the teaching of, the particular
doctrines as they may be defined by such judicatory. In other words, they
have made it the arbiter.

...

73

Two strands appear in the court's decision. First, the powers of an ecclesiastical
tribunal do not derive merely from any supposed lack of expertise in the civil
courts,74 but rather they derive in main from the contract between the organization and the member who is before the tribunal. Second, the tribunal itself is
viewed as fulfilling the function of an arbitrator (arbiter) rather than that of a
court. This second point should not be underestimated, as it suggests a useful
criterion for judicial scrutiny of such tribunals. The general rule is that the award
of an arbitrator will be upheld if the parties had agreed to arbitrate that particular dispute and the arbitrator stayed within the limits of the authority provided for him in the contract.7 5
It is this arbitral approach based on contract analysis which this article
proposes as a framework for the review of actions by religious organizations.
Applying this framework, it also becomes the duty of courts to examine whether
the organization stayed within the limits of its contractual authority by following
its own prescribed procedures and rules in dealing with the aggrieved member.
It should be emphasized that this contract framework does not presume to
realistically reflect an individual's relation to his church.7 6 It is suggested only
73 East Norway Lake Church v. Halvorson, 42 Minn. 503, 507-08, 44 N.W. 663, 665
(1890).
74 On the constitutional level there is another argument for civil court deference, based on
the "entanglement" rationale. It will be treated later. See text accompanying notes 105-122,
infra.
75 See, e.g., United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960); Note, judicial
Review of Labor Arbitration Awards After the Trilogy, 53 CORNELL L. REV. 136 (1967).
See also Aaron, Arbitration in the Federal Courts: Aftermath of the Trilogy, 9 U.C.L.A. L.
REv. 360 (1962).
76 The theory may, however, be factually valid for some. An example of a highly formal
contractual provision in a church membership rule is found in Slaughter v. New St. John's
Missionary Baptist Church, 8 La. App. 430 (1920). In suggesting the general applicability
of this framework, one remains cognizant that such a contractual relationship would often
seem odd as a matter of factual description; see Dusenberg, supra note 2, at 535. The common practice of many religious organizations is to grant membership at infancy, which is
slightly below the age of legal consent. Although this situation could conceivably cause difficulty if a parent attempted to contract away a child's future property, the important thing
to realize is that the question would then be arising under a coherent conceptual framework
of contract theory. Duress, lack of capacity, etc., are all terms within the contract framework. So although the framework cannot answer the question, it can provide a court with
the conceptual tools with which to attack it. A related problem for a contract theorist in this
area is whether a person can ever contract away too many of his civil rights to a religious
organization. While one approach would seem to say that there is no practical limit to what
an individual should be allowed to contract away, another view could plausibly assert that
some bargains in this realm should not be enforceable in court because they give away too
many of a person's "inalienable rights." While the problem is distressing in the abstract, and
courts have not had much occasion to rule upon it, it is possible to infer what the likely result
of such an attack would be. We are not talking here about a claim of duress, that the contract
was in any way the result of any illegitimate pressure. That situation is well-known to the
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that, by using a conceptual framework of contract theory, civil courts can develop
a coherent policy for the resolution of disputes between members and religious
organizations, within present constitutional parameters, and without sacrificing
either the reasonable expectations of the individual members or becoming enmeshed in issues of theology and the internal operations of religious groups.
A. The Contract Framework and Private Association Law
A substantial body of law governs the rights and obligations of members
vis-a-vis private associations. As religious associations are a subclass of this more
general group, 7 it seems natural to look to the body of law in this field to guide
US.
Often the formal rules of a private association have been used as standards
for judging the propriety of that association's actions."" Courts, emphasizing the
consensual nature and basis of the group, have treated the group's rules as terms
of a contract, and have enforced them against both the organization and the
members in accordance with ordinary contract law and doctrine. " Many
contract law doctrines have been applied to private associations, " but two
doctrines in particular are of interest with regard to religious organizations. These
are the doctrines of express and implied conditions. These two doctrines explain
theoretically why a religious organization should be bound to its own rules. If
the parties explicitly agreed that the authority of the organization depended on
obedience to its own rules, the result is obvious. If the organization fails to
perform its contractual obligation, the member should be released from his."
This follows from the application of principles totally unrelated to the religious
nature of the organization in question.
But few cases will contain an express condition that the organization abide
by its own rules. Contract law allows for implied conditions when reasonable
under the circumstances:
A fact or event may be a condition of a contractual right or duty, even
though the parties had no intention that it should so operate, said nothing
about it in words,
and did nothing from which an inference or intention
2
can be drawn.

courts, and would be handled as a standard problem regarding the enforceability of any contract. The narrow question raised is whether some bargains are just inherently unfair because
they surrender too much, they give up too many of the rights of a citizen, such that a court
should not enforce them. The answer would seem to be that there is no practical limit on
what an individual can agree to give up. Individuals have become monks and nuns, taken
vows of chastity and poverty, given up their freedom of travel such that a superior ecclesiastical
official can place them anywhere in the world, and no court we have found has seen fit to
intervene because of it. So although a contract with a religious group or organization should
be vulnerable to all the traditional contract defenses, there seems to be little chance of courts
refusing to enforce them because they surrender too much. In any event, this article is concerned primarily with establishing the legal framework which best can handle the general run

of cases.
77 See, e.g., Developments in the Law-judicial Control of Actions of Private Associations,
76 Hanv. L. Rnv. 983, 991-2 (1963) [hereinafter cited, as Developments].
78 Id. at 995.
79 Id. at 1001.
80 See A. CommN, CoRsnq oN CONTRACTS §§ 132, 628, 632, 637, 1252, 1257 (1962).
81 Id. at §§ 631, 1257-1259.
82 Id. at § 632.
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Such a fact or event is a constructive condition."3 Applying this doctrine, a court
could hold that procedural rectitude on the part of the organization is a 'constructive condition upon the individual's consent to be bound by the decisions and
tribunals of the organization. The doctrine seeks to do justice by reading into
contracts those things which the court feels the parties would have said, had they
thought of it. But in many cases this rationale is quite patently strained, and the
court is constructing the condition because, subject to express denial by the
parties, the court feels that justice requires it.8" Here again, the principles are
neutral as between religious and other organizations.
While the contract theory has been criticized on several grounds,85 these
criticisms apply to the application of the theory as regards any private association,
not merely its application in the religious context. Most importantly, courts have
enforced association rules on a contract basis. Recasting a bit, the objections have
no greater force against applying contract theory to religious organizations than
they do against applying it to any other association, and the courts have found
that the benefits outweigh the objections as regards those other types of organizations. Thus the arguments against the contract approach need not deter a court
from applying the theory in the religious context.
Several arguments have been put forth in favor of requiring an organization
to abide by its rules. First, by enforcing an organization's own rules against it,
a court helps to ensure that the governing body acts legitimately on behalf of the
organization; there simply is no other viable way to determine the authority of the
organization and its parts.88 Second, knowledge that courts will seek to determine
the agreed upon rights of members may well lead the organization to more consciously determine those rights, 7 thus settling in advance areas which otherwise
could produce disputes. These arguments cannot be dismissed lightly, and they
have no less force when the organization in question is religious.88 The problems
of tracing authority within an organization are no simpler in religious groups than
in others. And, in view of the tendency of courts to avoid religious cases, the
desire to eliminate disputes by encouraging the organization to make explicit the
rights and responsibilities of members may have added force when the organization is a religious one. Based on these grounds, then, a court would be justified on
policy in utilizing this general body of contract law to resolve litigation between
a member and his religious organization.
There is another objection, however, to applying contract law to churchmember disputes. Membership in a religious organization may entail a duty to
God imposed on the member, the organization, or both. This realm of the rela83 Id.
84 Id. Similar reasoning underlies the doctrine of impossibility of performance. Id. §§
1320-1333.
85 See Chaffee, The Internal Affairs of Associations Not for Profit, 43 HARV. L. REV. 993,
1001-07 (1930). It has been argued that such an approach entails a multiplicity of contracts
among all members, id. at 1002-03. Moreover, the theory does not explain certain features
unique to private association law, id. at 1004-05. These features are not relevant to the
present inquiry.
86 See Developments, supra note 77, at 1021.
87 Id.
88 Constitutional arguments for disparate treatment are possible, but they are not ultimately valid. See text accompanying notes 98-122, infra.
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tionship between man and God is usually considered to be outside the scope of a:
court's inquiry, and, as will be shown, this view is correct. The doctrine of constructive conditions, it may be argued, does not inherently except such cases from
its reach; and courts are not always wise.89 Thus, this argument criticizes the theory as inappropriate since it extends judicial scrutiny beyond the area where it
legitimately should operate. This objection can be parried, still staying on the
nonconstitutional plane. Indeed, there are reasons consonant with contractual
theory which counsel against interference with the man-God relation."0 Suppose,
for example, that a member claims that the organization is obligated by its rules
to pray for his health. The organization does not deny the obligation, but refuses
to fulfill it. What relief could a court both order and enforce? Clearly it could
order individuals to say certain words, but prayer-whatever its true nature may
be-seems to mean more than this.9 Whatever this "something more" 9 may
be,
2
it clearly seems beyond the powers of a civil court to detect and require.
Since it is axiomatic that a court, in exercising its equitable jurisdiction,"
will not order specific performance unless it is able to enforce that order,94 the
court should stay its hand here. From another perspective, the court could rely
on the doctrine that equity will not order specific performance where such performance depends on the will of the performer.9" Under either theory, a court
applying the contract approach would not intervene in the man-God relation
and the theory itself, when supplemented in this manner, is not rendered inappropriate.
A court has power to enforce its decrees only in the sphere of interpersonal
relationships. In the present context, this would include questions of organization,
membership, expulsion, the employment of clerics and other officials, disposition
of the church property, and an almost infinite number of other issues. It should
not be overly difficult for a court to determine which cases fall outside its enforcement power. This criterion for exercise of equitable jurisdiction is different
from the civil/ecclesiastical dichotomy which has been employed by some noninterventionist courts. 6 The two sets of criteria deal with the same universe of
facts, and as a factual matter, many of the issues which are considered "ecclesiastical" are beyond the enforcement power of a civil court. But this factual overlap
is not an analytic identity. For example, questions regarding membership
in the religious organization generally are within the court's enforcement
89 See notes 64-67, supra, and accompanying text.
90 See Comment, Enforceability of Religious Law in Secular Courts-It'sKosher, But Is It
Constitutional?, 71 MICH. L. Rav. 1641 (1973), where the man-God and man-man relationships are laid out and discussed.
91 The nature and meaning of prayer is well beyond the scope of this article. For those
interested in the matter, see D. Z. PHILLIPS, THE CONCEPT OF PRAYER (1966).
92 I avoid here the problems which may arise when a member claims that God owes him

a duty, but that the religious organization (in violation of its rules) has interfered with performance. If the problem in the text is unenforceable then, a fortiori this one is also. Cf.
United States ex rel. Mayo v. Satan and His Staff, 54 F.R.D. 282 (W.D. Pa. 1971).
93

A court clearly is acting in an equitable capacity when considering a suit for specific

performance such as the one being discussed here.
94 POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 1405 b,.at 1048-9 (5th ed. S. Symons 1941).
95 Id. (emphasis in original).
96 See text accompanying note 26, supra, and note 32, -supra.
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powers-it can order reinstatement, it can order further or new proceedings before the religious tribunals, etc. Yet on the civil/ecclesiastical dichotomy, such questions have been held to be ecclesiastical," and therefore not fit subjects for judicial action. What is suggested here is not simply a change of terms,
as the above example should make evident, but rather a change in perspectives.
Instead of struggling with a test applicable only to so-called "religious" cases
(i.e., is this an ecclesiastical question?), the jurisdictional criterion should be the
one applied to the whole range of equitable relief cases (i.e., is this case within the
court's enforcement power?).
B. The Constitutional Ground
Although the discussion thus far has been at a nonconstitutional level, the
first amendment cannot be neglected in formulating any general approach to
cases in this area. 8 The prevailing law was set by the Supreme Court's decision
in Presbyterian Church in the United States v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church.99 The case involved a dispute over church
property, and the Supreme Court held that the first amendment barred civil
courts from applying a test to resolve the dispute which gave the property to the
group which had departed least (or not at all) from the original doctrines of the
church. In a situation where at least one of the parties had not consented to
having the civil court decide questions of doctrine, the Supreme Court held that
such courts may not resolve disputes by making such a decision of religious
doctrine."' But by remanding, the Court made it clear that some state law
could be applied.'
The law which met the Court's test was comprised of
"neutral principles of law, developed for use in all property disputes, which can
be applied without 'establishing' churches to which property is awarded."'0 2
The contractual approach constitutes just such a body of "neutral principles of
law," a fact which a few post-Hull Church cases have recognized. 3 This conclusion is compelled by the fact that if the Court were to hold that contract
principles were not "neutral" within the meaning of Hull Church, the entire
original line of Supreme Court cases discussed earlier was incorrect.0 4 Given the
Court's extensive quotation from those early cases in Hull Church, this seems
unlikely.
Additional support for the constitutionality and desirability of the contract
approach comes from another line of first amendment cases, those dealing with
public financing of sectarian schools. The recent cases propose a threefold test to
ascertain when state intervention and involvement is permissible under the constitution. The test is phrased in terms of state statutes, but it applies as well for
97 See notes 26-28, supra, and accompanying text.
98 For work in this area, see sources cited in notes 10 and 13, supra.
99 393 U.S. 440 (1969).
100 Id. at 451.
101 Id.
102 Id. at 449.
103 See, e.g., Polen v. Cox, 259 Md. 25, 267 A.2d 201 (1970). See also note 125 infra,
and Kauper, supra note 10, at 373.
104 See text accompanying notes 17-22 supra.
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analytical purposes to common law doctrine. First, the statute in question must
have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must
be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion; and, third, the statute must
not foster an excessive entanglement with religion."0 5 The current approach was
stated by Mr. Justice Powell in Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist:. °.
the main criterion is whether a primary effect of the challenged statute is to advance religion." 7 As one commentator notes, for Powell an effect is primary if it
substantially advances religious activity, and this is true regardless of whether
the effect comes second in the chronological sequence of effects from the same
grant." 8 A New York plan to reimburse tuition paid to certain nonpublic schools
fell under this standard in Nyquist, as did a Pennsylvania system in Sloan v.
Lemon.'
The Court looked to the substance of the programs and made its own
judgment as to their effects.
From our point of view, then, the "neutral principles of law" required by
Hull Church must also pass the gauntlets of (1) not having a primary effect of
advancing religion, and (2) not fostering an excessive entanglement with religion.'" As far as the first test is concerned, the contract theory passes under any
reasonable construction. As noted earlier, the jurisprudence of contract law is
applicable to all spheres and organizations. It is hard to see how the enforcement
of intrachurch contractual arrangements could be claimed to advance religion.
It may be suggested that to require an organization to follow its own rules in some
sense interferes with its free exercise rights, but this is met with the argument that
to not enforce such rules violates the free exercise rights of the members. People
generally have the right to define the terms under which they will exercise their
religious choice. To let an organization ignore its rules serves effectively to deny
that right, and hence limit the members' free exercise potential."' Similarly, one
105 See, e.g., Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
106 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
107 Id. at 774-80.
108 See Morgan, The Establishment Clause and Sectarian Schools: A Final Installment?
1973 Sup. CT. Rav. 57, 78.
109 413 U.S. 825, 832 (1973). This is especially explicit in Sloan.
110 By definition, a "neutral principle" cannot be one which has behind it the purpose of
advancing religion.
111 This free exercise right seems, to me, to rest on a still more basic principle: the right to
choose. We choose whether or not to associate with a given religious group, and the free
exercise clause stands to protect that right of choice. In its baldest form, such a right to choose
does not even entail the right to limit the depth of one's commitment to that choice. Yet
surely there is no a priori reason to disallow such a right of limitation. The question is one
of determining which alternative is preferable. In one sense, to say that one can choose, but
not limit the effects of that choice is to limit the freedom to choose itself. And in the context before us here, there seems no good reason to impose such a limit.
Choice may be viewed as having at least two dimensions: breadth and depth. The breadth
of choice refers to the number of alternatives presented, and it must also take account of the
time factor. Two individuals may each have a universe of ten choice objects (in our context,
ten possible religious groups to which he may belong), out of which each may choose one
(they are only permitted to belong to one religion at a given time). At this point, their
breadth of choice is the same. But if, when the first individual makes his selection, he is then
barred from further choosing (either he cannot leave the group, or, if he leaves he cannot join
any other group), his entire breadth of choice is ten. If the second individual can make his
selection, and later change his mind, his breadth of choice is much larger. At t, he has ten
choice objects. When he changes his mind at t, he can go back to the universe and select
among the remaining nine objects. Whereas 1, has a total of one choice and ten choice objects,
I, has ten choices and fifty-five choice objects (ten at t1, nine at t2.... one at t, 0 ).
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could suggest that to enforce the organization's rules against its members
"establishes" the organization and hence "advances" religion. Yet to not enforce
those rules simply because the organization is a religious one, where the rules
of ordinary voluntary associations are enforced, seems just the sort of discrimina12
tion against religious groups which the free exercise clause is meant to bar."
What this seems to highlight is that the "primary effect of advancing" test
really has little application to the present case. The enforceability of contracts is
not some special benefit which the state confers upon certain organizations.
Rather, it is a part of the legal framework under which we all live. It is one of
the "givens" of our society.

The constitutionality of the contract approach under the school finance
Given this, we can deal with the question of allowing individuals to limit the depth of
their commitment to a given choice. For the sake of simplicity, imagine that depth of commitment can be measured in terms of the number of hours devoted to the chosen activity. In the
first instance, let us assume that I, must devote twenty-four hours per day to the activity
which he has chosen, but that 1, need only devote a minimum of two hours per day to his
chosen activity and in fact has chosen to give it just that minimum amount of time. It is
obvious that I,, in spite of his potential breadth of choice, cannot make another choice; there
are only twenty-four hours in a day. And it seems equally obvious that I, can choose up to
twenty-one more choice objects. Thus, in this simplified situation, it makes sense to say that I.
has a greater freedom of choice than I.
To apply this conclusion to our actual situation requires only minor adjustment. Instead
of being compelled to spend twenty-four hours per day on his choice, suppose that I. has
to spend "as long as necessary" on each choice he makes. All other conditions remain as above.
Thus 1, still has an absolute ability to take on twenty-one more choice objects. I. now also
can take on more choice objects, and he certainly cannot take on no more than twenty-one
(the two-hour minimum now applies to him, too); but his freedom is limited by another
variable-the amount of time each choice will require. If any one of his choices requires more
than the minimal two hours per day, he has fewer choices available than I. His freedom is
lessened because he is not allowed to limit the depth of his commitment.
The second premise necessary to legitimate court intervention is that our society protects,
to some degree, the right to have one's agreements enforced. Perhaps it is sufficient just to
note that this is a basic part of contract law, and is accepted as a premise underlying our idea
of an organized and civilized society. But the protection can also be derived from the choice
propositions discussed above. The maximal freedom of choice requires that the individual be
able to limit the depth of his commitment to a choice. How could this freedom be ensured?
What is to prevent a strong individual from compelling a weaker one to commit more deeply
than he would have liked, or from breaking off a commitment already made and relied upon
by the weaker party? It seems clear that the state must intervene here, or the freedom to
choose is simply an empty phrase written large. But if the state is to intervene, it must have
some standards upon which to use its force. Without some such guide, one or both sides
plausibly may claim that their freedom has been diminished. It is to avoid this charge that
we look to the "agreement" of the parties: what did they choose to do together? It is this
agreement, this mutual choice, which will be enforced.
It may be suggested that such a "locking in" of an individual to his agreements is also a
limit on his freedom. On analysis, I do not feel that this claim holds up. Our earlier examples
involved first-order choices: he chose the saw; she chose to be a doctor. But this does not
exhaust the universe. We can also choose at a second level: he chose to agree with her. What
characterizes this level is the entrance of a second choosing party and a choice object which
can only be attained by joint action. To allow both parties access to this second level of choice
objects, the state must enforce interpersonal agreements. Without such state intervention, the
"nonbreaching" party will be substantially deterred from selecting that set of choice objects
which require the cooperation of another. Such deterrence is, I would argue, a real limitation on the innocent party's freedom of choice.
The conclusions of this brief excursion into theory can be quickly stated: from the principles of free choice underlying the free exercise clause, it follows that both an individual and a
religious organization have the right to determine the conditions upon which they will interact,
and that the state will enforce whatever agreement they make regarding that interaction (ignoring, for the moment, considerations of public policy which might modify so sweeping a
conclusion).
112 See note 125 infra.
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cases does not rest on the "primary effect" test alone. It is buttressed by the
Court's third test: the state must not foster an excessive entanglement with religion. 1 3 This was the foundation of Lemon v. Kurtzman" and may be the key
to understanding the Court's approach. In Lemon, the Court struck down
Pennsylvania and Rhode Island plans to aid nonpublic schools. The Rhode
Island plan involved a salary supplement to teachers in nonpublic schools
given on condition that they not teach religion, but only courses offered (and
employ materials used) in the public schools. The Pennsylvania statute authorized the state Superintendent of Public Education to reimburse nonpublic schools
for teachers' salaries, textbooks, and materials for courses in particular secular
subjects not expressing any religious teaching, morals, or forms of worship.
Both statutes were held unconstitutional as fostering excessive entanglement
between government and religion. The Rhode Island program was found to
necessitate some surveillance of teachers in the nonpublic schools and the auditing
of school records to ensure compliance with the statutory conditions upon which
the aid was to be granted. These required state actions would, in the Court's
view, involve excessive entanglement between state and church." 5 The Penn11 6
sylvania program fell for the same reason.
These cases, therefore, hold that entanglement is constitutionally excessive
when the state must intrude to ensure that the religious organization is obeying
external limitations on its internal functioning. While this result is based on the
establishment clause, there is a respectable argument that such stateintrusion is
a form of government control over the internal affairs of the organization that
violates the free exercise proscription as well."" It must be stressed that the constitutional infirmity arises from external limitations on the organization. The
Court in no way intimates that it would be impermissible fot a state court to
ensure that internally imposed rules (made by the organization) are followed.
Policy reasons support this interpretation of, the Court's entanglement test.
The basis of the test is avoidance of religiopolitical strife.1 8 Justice Powell made
this explicit in Lemon.
A broader base of entanglement of yet a different character is presented
by the divisive political potential of these state programs .... Partisans of
parochial schools . . . will inevitably champion this cause and promote
political action to achieve their goals. Those who oppose state aid [to
parochial school] ... will inevitably respond and employ all of the usual
political campaign techniques to prevail.
The potential
divisiveness of such a conflict is a threat to the normal
119
political process.
113
114

See also, Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
403 U.S. 602 (1971).

115 Id. at 619.

116 Id. at 621-22.
f
117 See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 650-51 (Brennan, J.) (1971). The organization itself may not raise such a claim, but some of its members might. And if we are to say
that the organization spoke "for" the members, we have moved into a contractual realm by
"binding" the members to their organizational choice. .

118 See, e.g., Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664, 676 (1970).

119 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 622 '1971).
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This fear of promoting political strife was reiterated in Nyquist,2 0 and seems to
trouble the Court rather deeply. Although the limits of permissible entanglement
have not yet been set, it seems safe to say that an approach which engenders a
lesser risk of political strife while still resolving the dispute at hand is to be
preferred to one which carries greater risks.
On this constitutional basis, and on the premise that courts should protect
the reasonable expectations of members of religious organizations, the contract
approach is acceptable. The theory in no way imposes external limitations on an
organization's internal affairs. It does not, in other words, tell the organization
what it can or cannot make rules about, but requires only that the organization
abide by whatever rules it does make. Taking into account the free exercise
interest of the member, which is also involved in formulating a conceptual structure for this class of cases, the minimal intervention involved in requiring a
group to abide by its own rules should not be deemed "excessive entanglement."
The contract approach also responds sympathetically to fears of the strifeproducing tendencies of state involvement. Admittedly, if the state closed its
doors to all cases involving religious groups, any strife so caused could be claimed
not to be the result of state "entanglement." But this would be to totally ignore
both the reasonable expectations and free exercise interests of the members. And
short of such a "let the parties fight it out" approach, the contract rationale seems
to entail the least risk of producing religio-political strife. It does not place the
state in a position of either favoring or opposing the organization on any general
basis, but simply enforces whatever arrangement the members and the organization have made among themselves.
Although the Court did not advert to it, the entanglement argument may
have a negative bite. Perhaps the Court's analysis means that the state is obligated to intervene, to become somewhat entangled, in order to prevent possibly
greater strife. If, in fact, strife prevention is the underlying value to be protected,
as the Court says, then state intervention may be necessary if the absence of such
intervention would promote strife to a greater degree than would the intervention
itself. By this analysis, the minimal degree of entanglement entailed by the
contract approach may well be constitutionally required, not just allowed.
But even under the positive entanglement argument, the contract approach
passes muster. It avoids causing strife because, fundamentally, it provides an
organized and peaceful outlet for dispute settlement. And, for several reasons,
this is not an irritant in itself. First, the approach does not require the court to
deal with the substance of the dispute at all. 2' Second, as noted above, the approach itself does not prohibit or encourage the organization to make any
particular internal rule.' 22 It only enforces whatever rules are made. Third, the
knowledge that the courts will look to the rules and promises of the organization
to determine the rights of members could stimulate the organization to more
explicitly determine just what the rights of members will be. Such action by the
120 Committee for Public Ed. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist 413 U.S. 756, 794 (1973).
121 See text accompanying notes 123-129 infra.
122 Public policy sets some limits here, but these would seem to apply irrespective of whether
the contract approach is used. See note 125 infra.
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organization could prevent misunderstandings and disputes from arising, and,
thus, from ever reaching court. All else being equal, the fewer disputes that
reach the courts, the fewer the opportunities for court intervention and "entanglement." It seems reasonable to take, at least as a working hypothesis, that
the court approach which minimizes both the number of times a court must act
and the depth of its intervention when action is taken, also minimizes the chance
of a constitutionally impermissible "entanglement." Finally, the contract approach does not require the political process to enter the picture at all, avoiding
as completely as possible the potential of political strife.
Thus, on various grounds the contract approach seems to be acceptable
under the first amendment. It not only meets the criteria which the Supreme
Court has articulated, but it also lessens the chance of religio-political strife upon
which those criteria are rooted.
C. How to Apply the Theory
Under the contract framework as discussed herein, when an aggrieved
member seeks civil aid against some action of his religious organization, the court
will construe the relationship between the disputants as a contract. From this
contract, it will determine: ( 1) whether the parties agreed to submit the issue in
controversy to the religious tribunal, (2) whether the tribunal was faithful to its
own procedures and practices, and (3) whether the decision rendered was within
the tribunal's authority. If these conditions are met, the religious organization
has met its contractual obligations and the court will take no further action. For
judicial purposes, the individual's submission to the authority of such religious
tribunals is conditioned on the organization acting as it promised. 2 Under this
approach, when the organization made its own rules, it promised to each of its
members that these rules had meaning, that they could be used to predict how
the organization would behave. The contract theory protects that expectation
interest of the members. 4 By the same token, though, if the organization has
kept its end of the agreement, a court will protect the organization's legitimate
expectation interest by holding the member to his side of the agreement.
If the court finds that the organization has conformed to its agreement with
the member, it will treat the judgment of the religious tribunal as conclusive.
Except insofar as it is necessary to chart the broad limits of public policy, 25 courts
123 If the organization has incorporated under state law, compliance with those laws is
necessarily part of the organization's obligation to its members. See Hayes v. Brantley, 53
Misc. 2d 1040, 280 N.Y.S.2d 291 (1967) (discussed in text accompanying notes 42-46, supra).
124 For a discussion of the principles which a court could apply in this context, see text
accompanying notes 80-84, supra.

125 Public policy may override private choice here.
An example of an overriding state policy would be Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878), upholding laws
prohibiting polygamy against the claim that the Mormon Church approved of the practice as
part of the internal workings of the faith. This leaves open the problem of whether some
contracts in this area should be held unenforceable on other grounds. This could easily arise
regarding members of the current religious movement who are loosely termed "Jesus freaks." A
plausible claim of unconscionability or duress might be raised by the parents of children
joinmg such sects. The strong dissatisfaction with the present state of the law to handle this

situation has been manifested in the recent abducting of young people away from the religious

groups they have joined. See TisE, Aug. 20, 1973, at 83. See generally Note, Abduction,
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adopting this approach will not struggle with the merits of any individual case.
This is simply an extension of the idea of treating the religious tribunal as an
arbitrator. Had the approach required treating the religious tribunal as some
kind of court, we would then have to work out possible standards of review. For
example, would it make sense for a civil court to hold that a religious body's
determination about what the faith requires is "clearly erroneous"? A standard
which treats the religious tribunal as a court cannot escape becoming entangled
in the merits to some extent. The arbitral approach avoids that entanglement.
The arbitral approach also eliminates the immense task of defining the point
at which a question becomes "ecclesiastical" such that a civil court should decline
jurisdiction over it.' The court need only decide whether the parties agreed that
this issue, whatever its substantive content, was to be handled within the religious
organization. This threshold question is common in contract and arbitration law,
and is in no way beyond the court's enforcement powers. 2 The power of the
religious body would extend exactly as far as the parties contracted,12 and the
only function for the court would be to interpret that contract. 2 9
With freedom of contract enforced by the courts religious groups might fear
that individuals would attempt to condition membership on some sort of immunity from control. This fear seems idle. It confuses the legal structure with
the psychological reality that impels a person to join a religious organization. In
any case, the contract of membership almost certainly will have a provision for
necessary discipline, either express or implied, because without some kind of
discipline no organization can exist as such. The concept of organization entails
Religious Sects, and the Free Exercise Guarantee, 25 SYRa. L. REv. 623 (1974). While there
is no instant solution to this problem, it can be attacked within the established parameters of
contract law; see note 76, supra.
If a court enforced a contract of a religious group when a nonreligious contract would
not have been enforced, it would be open to the charge of "establishing" that religion.
Of course, if a religious contract were not enforced in a situation where a nonreligious one
would be, the claim would be that the religious organization was being penalized in derogation of its rights to free exercise. One clear solution would be for the courts to ignore the
religious nature of the contract entirely: "[R]eligion may not be used as a basis for classification for the purposes of governmental action.. . ." Kurland, Of Church and State and the
Supreme Court, 29 U. CHI. L. REv. 1, 5 (1961). This seems the most reasonable way to comply with the Supreme Court's recent command in Presbyterian Church v. Hull Church, 393
U.S. 440, 449 (1969), to apply "neutral principles of law" in areas of church-civil interaction.
See text accompanying notes 32-38, supra. See also Everson v. Bd. of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 18
(1947); Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 356-7 (1970) (Harlan, J. concurring).
126 See note 26, supra and accompanying text.
127 See notes 144-151, infra and accompanying text.
128 See ZOLLMANN, supra note 2, at 226. It is interesting to note that in cases where a nonCatholic seeks to marry a Catholic, and is compelled to sign an antenuptial agreement that all
children will be raised Catholics, courts will void the agreement if the marriage ends in
divorce and the non-Catholic spouse gets custody of the children. See Pfeffer, Religion in the
Upbringing of Children, 35 B.U. L. Rav. 333, 360 (1955). See also Boerger v. Boerger, 26
N.J. Super. 90, 97 A.2d 419 (1953). While the usual explanation given is concern for the
welfare of the child, it is not unreasonable to assume that courts have realized that such antenuptial agreements are often the result of severe mental and emotional duress; however, the
use of duress as a tool to void the oppressive impact of other religious contracts does not appear
widespread, or even visible.
129 At least one court has applied just this approach, and has held that where the parties
voluntarily submit civil matters to a church tribunal (here, a civil libel action), the court will

treat the result exactly as it would any other consensual arbitration. Berman v. Shatnes

Laboratory, 350 N.Y.S.2d 703 (N.Y.A.D. 1973). To recast this into constitutional terms, the
law of review of arbitration awards is made up of principles which are neutral as between
religious and civil arbitrators.
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the idea that the individuals give up some measure of autonomy for the good of
the whole. 3 0
Adoption of a contract framework would be beneficial to all sides. Religious
organizations will be assured of complete internal autonomy, subject only to their
own rules. Members will be protected by having their reasonable expectations,
as embodied in the organization's rules, upheld. 1 And the courts will be able
to avoid entanglement in religious issues, thus avoiding the conceptual swamp
which this entire area of church-member conflicts has become.
D. The Theory Applied
A few modem courts are moving toward a contract approach. Some have
applied bits and pieces, while some have articulated a whole version of the theory.
In Baugh v. Thomas,'3 ' plaintiff sued for reinstatement as a member of the local
Baptist church. He alleged that the vote of the church which denied his request
for reinstatement was not conducted or counted as the constitution of the church
demanded. "In short, he contends that a tabulation of the votes which comported with Church procedure would result in his reinstatement.?'" 3 The lower
court dismissed the complaint, asserting lack of jurisdiction over questions of
church membership.?3 The New Jersey Supreme Court unanimously reversed,
holding that plaintiff's complaint stated a cause of action which the courts could
hear in that it alleged that his nonreinstatement was the result of a violation of
the church's own rules.'
[Expulsion from a church or other religious organization can constitute a
serious emotional deprivation which, when compared to some losses of
property or contract rights, can be far more damaging to the individual.
The loss of the opportunity to worship in familiar surroundings is a valuable
right which deserves the protection of the law....
...The status of membership in a voluntary [religious] association is sufficient
to warrant at least limited judicial examination of the reason for expulsion. 38
While the court did not invoke the contract framework explicitly, it utilized some
of the basic premises previously outlined. The court accepted the idea that jurisdiction over religious organizations should include treating the right of membership as a protected interest. Yet, while the court extended the scope of its super130 See ZOLLMANN, supra note 2, at 224-25 and cases cited therein. See also text accompanying note 142 infra. The problem created by a religious organization demanding too much
compliance is discussed in note 76 supra.
131 ZOLLMANN, at 232.
132 56 N.J. 203, 265 A.2d 675 (1970).
133 Id. at 209, 265 A.2d at 678.
134 Id. at 205, 265 A.2d at 676.
135 Id. at 210, 265 A.2d at 678.
136 Id. at 208, 265 A.2d at 677. Professor Chaffee stated the same idea in language a bit
more colorful:
Excommunication from a church means the loss of the opportunity to worship God in
familiar surroundings with a cherished ritual, and inflicts upon the devout believer
loneliness of spirit and perhaps the dread of eternal damnation. In comparison with
such emotional deprivations, mere losses of property often appear trivial.
Chaffee, supra note 85, at 998.
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vision, it limited its depth by restricting review to whether the organization has

followed its own accepted procedures. The most plausible reason why this procedural rectitude should matter at all is that the power of the religious organization is conditioned upon the exercise of that power in accordance with the

organization's rules.' 37 By holding that Baugh had made out a cause of action,
the court necessarily implied that if he could prove the procedural miscarriage

which he alleged, it would void the nonreinstatement (i.e., it would require a new

vote or order him reinstated on the basis of the original ballot count).
Pennsylvania recently has come completely into the contract camp.'

In

Western Pennsylvania Conference of United Methodist Church v. Everson
Evangelical Church of North America,"' a church conference sued to establish
ownership of the local church property. The lower court held for the conference
(the parent group) in a judgment on the pleadings, and the Pennsylvania
supreme court affirmed without dissent. The case centered around the Book of
Discipline and the Constitution of the United Methodist Church. The local
organization sought both to withdraw from the parent group and to keep the
local church property. But in its answer to the complaint, the local group admitted that it was subject to the control of the church hierarchy through the Book
of Discipline, and that the Book of Discipline governed the use of church
property. The Pennsylvania supreme court rested firmly on the contract theory:
"The Book of Discipline of the United Methodist Church is a contractual agreement between the parent denomination and its members."' 4
Since there was no allegation that the parent did not follow its own procedures, the only question under the contract approach was whether the issue
between the parties had been confided to the decision of the church hierarchy.
When the local group admitted this fact, the court's inquiry ended. The case is a
model of how the contract approach allows a court to resolve a dispute involving
religious groups without itself becoming entangled in religious questions.
As of this writing, two other state supreme courts have explicitly adopted
the contract framework as their preferred analytic tool to determine the extent of,
and the criteria for, civil court intervention in these types of cases. The decisions of both courts are tightly reasoned, and show graphically how flexible
the contract approach can be.
In Massachusetts, members of a religious corporation' 4 (the Albanian Orthodox Diocese in America, Inc.) sued the corporation and four of its officers, alleging that the Diocese and its officers had devised a scheme to deprive plaintiffs
of their right to vote in the Diocese and "[to] foist upon The Diocese as Bishop,

137 See note 80 and accompanying text supra.
138 Compare Western Pennsylvania Conference of United Methodist Church v. Everson
Evangelical Church of North America, 454 Pa. 434, 312 A.2d 35 (1973), with Kaminski v.
Hoynak, 373 Pa. 194, 95 A.2d 548 (1953).
139 454 Pa. 434, 312 A.2d 35 (1973).
140 454 Pa. at 439, 312 A.2d at 38.
141 Religious groups are permitted to incorporate under MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 180, § 3
(Supp. 1974). Most states have similar provisions. See, e.g., N.Y. RELIG. CoRn. LAW §§ 1-414
(McKinney Supp. 1975), which includes various and sundry provisions which have been especially tailored to the needs of certain specific denominations.
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the defendant, Stephen Lasko, all in derogation of the by-laws of the Diocese."'4 2
Plaintiffs prevailed in the lower court, and obtained a decree ordering a new
meeting of the Diocesan Council to reconsider the actions in question."' The
Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, grounding its judgment on contract
analysis. The court found that the Diocese had adopted a code of bylaws which
both defined membership and detailed the procedures required to qualify for such
status.'" The bylaws also provided for the election of a "permanently acting
bishop." The dispute arose when Lasko went to Albania, and returned claiming
to have been consecrated bishop there under canon law. The other defendants
called an annual meeting of the membership, but 115 persons who were members
in good standing under the bylaws, including the plaintiffs, were never notified.
The meeting apparently ratified Lasko as bishop. The defendants contended
that the selection of the bishop was purely an ecclesiastical matter to be governed
by canon law, and that once a bishop had been consecrated there was no need
to elect a "permanently acting bishop" as provided under the bylaws."" The
court rejected that argument, and set its analytic framework explicitly:
We perceive the dispute now before us not as one of church law... but [as]
one of contract law . ... We only interpret the by-laws of a Massachusetts
corporation which constitute a contract between the members and the
Diocese..

.48

The court declined to consider whether Lasko was a bishop,' 47 and confined
itself to determining whether proper action had been taken under the bylaws. 8
Because the bylaws constituted a contract between the members and the
Diocese,'49 the Diocese had power over the members only to the extent that it
operated under that contract. Taking this reasoning one step further, the court
held that the bishop of the Diocese had to be selected in accordance with the bylaws. ' It was from those bylaws that the bishop derived his authority. Because
the organization failed to abide by its side of the contract (by not following its
own rules), Lasko had no authority in the Diocese, and the lower court was correct in ordering a new meeting. 5 '
Another modem leading case applying the contract framework is the 1972
decision of the Wisconsin supreme court in Olston v. Hallock."5 ' Olston sued to be
142 Mitchell v. Albanian Orthodox Diocese in America, Inc., 355 Mass. 278, 279, 244
N.E.2d 276, 277 (1969).
143 Id.
144 Id. at 280, 244 N.E.2d at 278.
145 Id. at 282, 244 N.E.2d at 279.
146 Id. (emphasis supplied).
147 Id. In Polen v. Cox, 259 Md. 25, 267 A.2d 201 (1970) the Maryland court of appeals
noted that: "The relevant inquiry must be whether the court can resolve the property dispute
on the basis of neutral principles of law which do not involve the resolution by the court of
ecclesiastical issues." 259 Md. at 30, 267 A.2d at 204 (emphasis in the original). In the
present case, the court scrupulously avoided passing judgment on the validity of Lasko's claim to
have been consecrated.
148 355 Mass. at 282, 244 N.E.2d at 279.
149

150
151
152

See note 84 supra.

355 Mass. at 283, 244 N.E.2d at 279.
Id.
55 Wis. 687, 201 N.W.2d 35 '(1972).
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reinstated as minister of St. Paul's Episcopal Church. The lower court granted
summary judgment for -the defendant Episcopal Bishop 'of Milwaukee, and
Olston appealed. The facts underlying the case are both complex and, in light
of the court's disposition of the case on jurisdictional grounds, unimportant..
[T]he trial court was correct in determining that it had no jurisdiction to
"call" of Olston was not temporal in nature and civil court. review is limited

review the merits of the determination of, the ecclesiastical tribunal .. . [t]he

to determining whether the ecclesiastical tribunal had authority to proceed,
and whether it proceeded according to its rules and procedures. 53

The first issue was whether the tribunal had authority in the case. The court held
that it did, saying, "[W]hen Olston accepted the 'call' to St. Paul's, all the
canons of both the local Diocese and the national Church became a part of his
pastoral contract."'5 4 One of the canons so incorporated set 'forth the procedures
for the dismissal of a minister. The same contract which gave Olston his rights
as a minister also gave the bishop the right to remove him. The court next found
that the church had followed its own prescribed procedures, 5 ' and ended the
inquiry.
The scope of review paralleled that which would have been given to the
decision of an arbitrator, and is the one commended here as a general policy.
Since Olston could not show any grounds which would have warranted setting
aside an arbitration award, 5 ' the court was correct in finding no grounds warranting setting aside the decision of the church.
V. Conclusion
At the start of this article, two questions were posed:
1) Over what disputes, if any, should civil courts take jurisdiction in this
area?
2) What criteria should courts apply to decide those cases?
The contract framework provides specific answers to both questions. First, all
disputes which are resolvable by the power of the civil courts should be cognizable
in those courts, regardless of any religious overtones which they might have. Issues
which were once called "ecclesiastical" will generally be beyond the court's power,
or will have been reserved to the power of the religious organization and its
tribunals under the membership contract.'57 Remaining issues should cause no
problems for the court: if it is found that the issue in question has been confided
to the religious organization, a court can move to the second question. 5 8 The
153 Id. at 696, 201 N.W.2d at 39 (emphasis supplied).
154 Id. at 699, 201 N.W.2d at 41.
155 Id. at 700, 201 N.W.2d at 41.
156 See text accompanying note 75 supra; see also ZOLLMANN, supra note 2,at 233.
157 See, e.g., Mitchell v.Albanian Orthodox Diocese, supra note 142; see also Carter v.
Papineau, 222 Mass. 464, 111 N.E. 358 (1916).
158 Of course, if the issue was not one which the parties confided in the religious tribunal,
then any decision made by such a tribunal would be a nullity and the court would take jurisdiction by default.
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criteria by which courts should review decisions and actions of religious organizations and tribunals are the criteria used to decide whether to set aside an
arbitrator's award. 59 Since the parties confided the power of decision to the
religious body, the only remaining questions are whether that body followed its
own rules and procedures and whether the "award" was within its power to
make.
The framework incorporates both major policy concerns found in the area.
The reasonable expectations of members that they will be treated by the organization in accordance with its rules are protected both by the initial inquiry as
to which body had the contractual authority to decide the issue and by the
second inquiry as to whether that body followed its own rules. The concern
over becoming entangled in questions of theology and religious law is met by the
limitation of the depth of the court's inquiry to the above two topics, which
should succeed in keeping all but the most impetuous of courts outside the sphere
of religious law. By consciously adopting and applying such a framework, courts
can dispel much of the murkiness, arbitrariness, and seeming legerdemain which
surround the interventionist and noninterventionist approaches.
In essence, the contract approach can best be viewed as an ordering principle. It would enable a court to extend a familiar legal matrix over a new area
of fact and focus on the most important policy questions. The contract approach
holds the prospect of simplicity and order for this particularly thorny segment of
the judicial landscape.

159

See text accompanying note 75 supra.

